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On 6 September 2015 the Kurdish separatist group PKK attacked two armoured military 
vehicles in Daglica, a provincial town near Turkey’s border with Iran and Iraq. This was the 
deadliest terrorist attack – 17 dead and several others injured – since the launching of ‘the 
peace process’ in 2012. Announcing the incident on TV, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan 
suggested that such attacks would not have occurred if voters had given 400 MPs to ‘one 
political party’ in the June 2015 election.1 After 13 years of single-party rule, the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) founded by Erdogan had indeed lost its parliamentary majority in 
the June 2015 election and was forced to lead coalition talks with other parties. The national 
daily Hurriyet soon broadcast Erdogan’s words from its website, thereby reinforcing the view 
widely shared by those in the opposition that the president had escalated the conflict with 
the PKK to win back conservative voters in the snap election scheduled for November 2015. 
Disturbed by his implied association with post-election violence, Erdogan protested to the 
newspaper.2 A few hours later a group of AKP vigilantes, led by the leader of the AKP’s youth 
branch and Istanbul MP, attacked Hurriyet’s headquarters in Istanbul.3 The police stood aside 
during the incident;4 luckily no one was injured. This contentious day captured quite accu-
rately the current condition of Turkish politics on the eve of the snap election. The AKP’s desire 
to hang on to power despite its electoral defeat accompanied a dramatic rise in political 
violence and extra-parliamentary opposition, which, in turn, increased government pressure 
on dissent, including censorship in the media and implicit endorsement of violent attacks 
against the opposition by AKP supporters.
ABSTRACT
Since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 
2002 Turkey has undergone double regime transitions. First, tutelary 
democracy ended; second, a competitive authoritarian regime has 
risen in its stead. We substantiate this assertion with specific and 
detailed evidence from 2015 election cycles, as well as from broader 
trends in Turkish politics. This evidence indeed confirms that elections 
are no longer fair; civil liberties are being systematically violated; and 
the playing field is highly skewed in favour of the ruling AKP. The June 
2015 election results and their aftermath further confirm that Turkey 
has evolved into a competitive authoritarian regime.
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 In this paper we argue that Turkey under the AKP government has devolved from a 
tutelary democracy into a competitive authoritarian regime. We also claim that Turkey is 
part of a broader trend of global authoritarian retreat observed in the weakening of political 
institutions and the erosion of rule of law by leaders who had initially come to power through 
the ballot box.5 Indeed, scholars have acknowledged the AKP government’s limiting civil 
liberties and increasing concentration of power in Erdogan’s hands,6 yet few have noted 
Turkey’s retreat into an authoritarian model under AKP rule.7
 Our aim in this paper is twofold. First, we engage in this debate by demonstrating that 
Turkey no longer satisfies even the minimal requirements of democracy.8 Second, we aim to 
carve out analytical space to study other cases of democratic backsliding, such as Thailand 
and Hungary, through a detailed analysis of Turkey, a critical yet under-studied case in the 
democratisation literature.
 In what follows we first discuss the reasons why ‘competitive authoritarianism’ better 
captures Turkey’s regime trajectory than types of defective democracy. We then continue 
with a brief discussion of the end of tutelary democracy in Turkey. This discussion is critical, 
since tutelary powers and competitive authoritarianism are mutually exclusive, as proposed 
by Levitsky and Way.9 In section three we substantiate competitive authoritarianism in Turkey 
with a particular focus on the June and November 2015 elections, to demonstrate how the 
playing field is skewed in favour of the AKP. Specifically we discuss the ways in which the 
party has abused its control over the state-owned media and regulatory agencies; used 
legal actions to harass critics and reward supporters in the media and civil society; employed 
large-scale repression of opposition groups through the securitisation of dissent; and relied 
on widespread use of public resources and abuse of public-policy instruments to gain access 
to greater private finance for the party. We conclude with a discussion of the November 
2015 elections.
Why competitive authoritarianism?
With the end of the cold War there has been an increase in competitive authoritarian (cA) 
regimes.10 unlike fully fledged autocracies, cA regimes hold regular elections devoid of fraud 
as the primary means for attaining power. But the government’s partisan use of state institu-
tions makes it unlikely for the opposition to defeat the incumbent, thereby rendering such 
cases undemocratic. As Levitsky and Way succinctly put it, ‘such regimes are competitive in 
that opposition parties use democratic institutions to contest seriously for power, but they 
are not democratic because the playing field is heavily skewed in favor of incumbents’.11 Put 
differently, competition in such cases is real but unfair. While incumbency carries a certain 
degree of advantage even in liberal democracies, cA regimes stand out by undermining the 
opposition’s capacity to organise and compete in elections. In these cases the government 
appropriates state resources for partisan distribution and packs state institutions system-
atically with its loyalists. It also controls the media to limit the opposition’s access to voters 
and weaken its political campaigns. Lastly, government critics are threatened, harassed and, 
occasionally, prosecuted. As a result of the government’s skewed access to resources and 
institutions, the opposition faces an uneven playing field against the incumbent party.
 This paper asserts that, under the rule of the AKP, Turkey has devolved into such a com-
petitive authoritarian regime, instead of consolidating its democracy (or remaining a type 
of defective democracy for that matter). Accordingly, the AKP, which first came to power in 
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2002, has captured state institutions through its electoral victories and used its power to 
establish hegemony over Turkish society. under its dominance the opposition has continued 
to participate in national and local elections but faces an uphill battle in competing against 
the ruling party.
 We suggest that competitive authoritarianism better captures the complexity of ongo-
ing regime change in Turkey than do several types of defective democracy (eg delega-
tive, electoral, majoritarian, plebiscitarian or illiberal).12 First, recent trends in Turkey not 
only demonstrate a lack of democratic consolidation but they also denote a clear case of 
authoritarian retreat, as we show below. Second, these subtypes fail to depict the nature 
of political contestation in Turkey, where elections function as key political institutions and 
permit competition, albeit on a highly uneven playing field. As such, the fairness of elections 
is increasingly contested; civil liberties are systematically violated; and the playing field is 
highly skewed in favour of the incumbent AKP. The concepts of illiberal or electoral democ-
racy are attuned to violations of civil liberties yet they fail to assess the implications of a 
skewed playing field for free and fair elections, which constitute the essence of even defective 
democracies. Most scholars of Turkish politics continue to classify Turkey as majoritarian or 
illiberal democracy with heavy Islamist undertones, with occasional references to a trend 
towards electoral authoritarianism.13 Here, we provide ample evidence to demonstrate how 
the AKP government’s policies have obstructed ‘the freedom, fairness, inclusiveness, and 
meaningfulness of elections’ which, according to Diamond, distinguishes electoral democ-
racies from electoral authoritarianism.14
 Third, these concepts differ in their implications. Subtypes of democracy often carry a 
bias in favour of democratic transition and therefore fail to capture the distinctive logic of 
authoritarian politics. By way of contrast, the concept of competitive authoritarianism allows 
us to assess the role of formal and informal rules in cases where democratic institutions 
coexist with authoritarian incumbents.15 As such, competitive authoritarianism takes into 
account aspects of a political regime other than its electoral system, thereby allowing us to 
focus on different aspects of the AKP’s regime.
 Finally, competitive authoritarianism better depicts the empirical reality in Turkey com-
pared with subtypes of democracy. For instance, Tas asserts that Turkey has transformed 
into a delegative democracy under the AKP, one where Erdogan acts as an embodiment of 
national interest with his anti-political stature.16 A closer look at Erdogan’s discourse, however, 
reveals unprecedented attempts to polarise and politicise Turkish society.17 That Erdogan has 
consistently violated the norms of impartiality in favour of the AKP since his ascendance to 
the presidency is another challenge for the concept of delegative democracy. Put differently, 
the uneven playing field, as we discuss in detail below, implies that the Turkish case lacks 
not only horizontal but also vertical accountability as a result of the absence of fair elections.
 In fact, O’Donnell coined the term ‘delegative democracy’ based on his political obser-
vations of Argentina, Brazil and Peru, countries that were governed by a presidential system 
and led by charismatic politicians.18 In the existing parliamentary system in Turkey, how-
ever, no leader can claim power without being backed by a strong political party. Thus, up 
until the 2014 presidential elections Erdogan exercised power as the leader of a dominant 
party. His election as president in August 2014 with the popular vote has not altered this 
reality, since the current constitution in Turkey vests executive power in the hands of the 
prime minister. The de facto situation that Erdogan created after his election – acting as the 
head of the executive – has ensued because of the AKP’s control over parliament and his 
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uncontested power in the party.19 Erdogan’s power, in other words, depends on the AKP’s 
continued electoral success.20
 Finally, the classification of the Turkish case as a delegative democracy obscures the 
qualitative difference between the AKP’s dominant party regime and the centre-right gov-
ernments of the post-1980 period which, though corrupt and violating civil liberties, fell 
short of dominating and monopolising the political arena.
 Recent political developments in Turkey offer an invaluable opportunity to generate 
novel theories on democratisation and authoritarian reversals. Given its history of multiparty 
politics, mid-level income and accession talks with the Eu, Turkey – together with Thailand 
and Hungary – has been one of the major democratic under-performers of the past decade.21 
After all, the country scores high on structural factors, which scholars of comparative politics 
have identified as necessary for democratic consolidation; Turkey neither faces a resource 
curse nor has a weak state – two conditions that have thwarted democratic consolidation 
in other parts of the global South. After the 2001 financial crisis the Turkish economy grew 
rapidly and the country’s level of economic development is higher than that of many coun-
tries which have consolidated their democratic regimes in the past two decades. By contrast, 
despite experiencing its first democratic turnover in 1950, Turkey has failed to consolidate 
its democratic regime.
The end of tutelary democracy in Turkey
The AKP rose to power in an unconsolidated democracy where the military’s legal–institu-
tional role amounted to a virtual veto power over elected officials.22 The judiciary also acted 
as a veto-player in the democratic system, wielding tutelary powers.23 In its tenure since 2002, 
however, the AKP has empowered formerly disenfranchised social groups of predominantly 
Islamic and Kurdish identity, and curtailed the power of the veto-players in Turkish politics. 
Specifically the AKP has undercut the military’s political power by opening up a greater space 
for elected officials in decision making through a series of reforms and has redesigned the 
higher courts via judicial reforms enacted through a constitutional referendum.
 With its strong electoral mandate, the AKP reduced the military’s influence in politics 
(1) by implementing legal reforms that reduced the institutional power of the military in 
decision making; (2) through the political de-legitimisation of the military’s extra-legal inter-
ventions in politics; and (3) by criminalising such interventions. These institutional reforms 
entailed a reduction in the power of the military through a set of alterations: the number 
of civilian members in the National Security council (MGK) increased;24 the frequency of 
MGK meetings was reduced, while the decisions made by the council were downgraded to 
the level of recommendations for the government, recommendations that did not require 
the council’s supervision over their implementation; the composition of the boards of the 
council of Higher Education (yOK) and the Radio and Television Supreme council (RTuK) 
were altered by taking out the seat reserved for military officers; and, lastly, the EMASyA 
protocol, which allowed the military authorities to bypass civilian authorities in responding 
to social incidents, was annulled.25
 If these reforms limited the scope of the military’s legal–institutional influence in politics, 
a critical set of developments after 2007 rendered the military’s extra-legal intervention 
politically illegitimate. The government dismissed the armed forces’ attempt to intervene in 
the presidential elections of 2007 as unacceptable by underlining the primacy of democratic 
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procedures. Subsequently, the AKP took steps to criminalise military involvement in politics 
through a set of court cases that began during the party’s second term in office (2007–11). 
In the ‘Ergenekon’ and ‘Sledgehammer’ cases, hundreds of retired and on-duty high-ranking 
military personnel were brought before the courts to answer allegations of conspiring to 
overthrow the elected AKP government.26 Among these officers were the former chief of 
general staff, Ilker Basbug, and several former commanding officers of the army. These court 
cases signified that the military was no longer untouchable nor were they above censure by 
the elected civilian government.27 These developments brought about a dramatic change in 
civil–military relations in Turkey by reducing the influence of military officers over politics.28
 At the same time the AKP garnered success as the representative of the disenfranchised – 
the social groups of explicitly Islamic or Kurdish identity formerly sidelined under the Kemalist 
regime established in 1923 – expanding the social basis for democracy and increasing the 
legitimacy of the democratic system in Turkey. Attesting to this fact is the decline in support 
for Shari’a and an Islamic regime among the Islamic constituencies, who felt included and 
represented in the democratic system after the AKP came to power, from 21% in 1999 to 9% in 
2007.29 Similarly the AKP altered the Kurdish policy of its predecessors and opened up space 
for the expression of Kurdish identity in the public realm.30 Indeed, despite its shortcomings 
and tumultuous nature, the AKP also initiated a peace process with the Kurdish insurgency 
to resolve the protracted conflict in the country.
 Despite these critical steps, the AKP oscillated between liberal and majoritarian under-
standings of democracy.31 First, the party’s desire to dictate its terms on Kurdish and Alevi 
groups, instead of engaging in deliberation, generated doubts about the party’s attachment 
to liberal democratic principles.32 Second, the process of civilianisation of politics came at a 
high cost, as the AKP’s undemocratic and illiberal measures in highly politicised trials against 
members of the armed forces eroded rule of law as well as fundamental human rights. For 
instance, defendants of both the ‘Ergenekon’ and ‘Sledgehammer’ cases witnessed a violation 
of their fundamental rights in due process. As the recent conflict between the AKP govern-
ment and the Gulen movement has revealed,33 the party apparently utilised courts under 
the influence of the Gulenists to subdue and intimidate the rank and file in the armed forces, 
often through fabricated evidence and violation of due process.34 The subordination of the 
judiciary, which started with these trials, did indeed come full circle when the AKP govern-
ment passed a constitutional referendum in 2010 designing the higher courts and Supreme 
council of Judges and Prosecutors.35 In short, by the end of 2010 the AKP had already pacified 
most of the veto-players in the system and ended the era of tutelary democracy in Turkey.
Competitive authoritarianism in the making
The end of tutelary democracy in Turkey did not result in democratic consolidation in the 
country, as hoped by students of Turkish politics. Instead, the popularly elected AKP gov-
ernment took an authoritarian turn. The AKP used its electoral strength – based on a cross-
class coalition across both urban and rural areas – to dominate political institutions and 
exploit state resources in a partisan manner to block the opposition’s chances of winning an 
election. While falling short of outright repression, these measures have tilted the playing 
field against the opposition parties, thereby allowing the AKP to stay in power without the 
need to resort to massive electoral fraud and repression.36 These developments meant that 
Turkey now fulfilled the criteria of competitive authoritarianism rather than of a defective 
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democracy. That is, ‘[Turkey] is not a full authoritarian regime; there is universal suffrage; the 
authority of elected officials are not restricted by unelected tutelary powers; and at least 
one of the following criteria are met: 1) unfair elections, 2) violation of civil liberties, and 3) 
uneven playing field.’ 37 We have already addressed the disestablishment of tutelary powers 
under the AKP. We now turn to the three definitive criteria of competitive authoritarianism 
observed in Turkey.
Unfair elections
Levitsky and Way suggest that elections are unfair in cases where ‘1) at least one major can-
didate is barred for political reasons, 2) centrally coordinated and tolerated electoral abuse 
is asserted by credible independent sources (serious partisan manipulation of voter rolls, 
large-scale voter intimidation, ballot-box stuffing, falsification of results), 3) significant formal 
or informal impediments prevent the opposition from campaigning on equal footing and 4) 
the playing field is uneven’.38 Although the authors claim at least one of the four is sufficient 
to designate a regime cA, Turkey exhibits multiple such indicators.
 To start with, no major candidate is barred for political reasons under AKP rule. Neither is 
there sufficient evidence showing the presence of centrally coordinated and tolerated elec-
toral abuse. That said, the electoral process has come under greater scrutiny in recent years. 
After the 2010 referendum, the composition of the Supreme Election council (ySK) – whose 
members are elected by the Supreme court and the council of State – changed in a way that 
increased the government’s influence.39 Furthermore, allegations of electoral abuse during 
vote counting in the March 2014 local elections reached unprecedented levels, particularly 
in closely contested areas like Ankara and Antalya, won by the AKP.40 The ySK’s refusal to 
answer these allegations, coupled with high-level government officials’ visits to the election 
centres in Ankara and Antalya during the vote-counting process,41 further increased doubts 
as to the fairness of elections in Turkey.42
 Before the June 2015 elections the opposition politicians and media also raised concerns 
about Turkey’s use of computer Supported centralized Voter Roll System software, which 
they argued could be open to electronic manipulation.43 The absence of routine election 
observation by international actors further intensified concerns over widespread vote rig-
ging. Largely in response to these fears, a new civil society group – Oy ve Otesi – spearheaded 
a public campaign to monitor elections. Despite the pro-AKP media’s attempts to undermine 
the credibility of this civil society initiative before the June and November 2015 elections,44 
Oy ve Otesi managed to monitor 76% of the ballot boxes in November. After the elections the 
organisation reported only a 0.02% mismatch between its unofficial count and the election 
results released by the ySK in the polls monitored.45
 As this discussion shows, there is no systematic electoral manipulation in Turkey. However, 
the absence of rigged elections does not necessarily mean that elections are fair. The elec-
tion laws in Turkey do not allow for parties to campaign for extended periods. Needless to 
say, this created a huge advantage for the ruling AKP, which in effect began to campaign 
unofficially at public events. By contrast, this short period was not enough for the opposi-
tion – already excluded from much of the media and with limited resources, as discussed 
below – to carry its message to new voters. Furthermore, the opposition was denied com-
petition on an equal footing. In several instances when an opposition rally coincided with 
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a government-sponsored event (especially those attended by the prime minister or the 
president) at the same place, the opposition party was asked to reschedule the event.46
 More disconcerting with regard to the fairness of the elections have been growing attacks 
on opposition activists, particularly the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) in the 
course of the election campaigns of June and November. On 18 May 2015 two bombs det-
onated in the HDP’s provincial headquarters in Mersin and Adana. Against this backdrop, 
there were two serious attacks at HDP rallies during the closing week of the campaign cycle 
in June. On 4 June a large group attacked an HDP pre-election rally, injuring 38 people, while 
the next day two explosions at the HDP Diyarbakir rally killed three people and injured over 
100. A Human Rights Association (IHD) report reveals that between March 2015 and June 
2015 there were 176 attacks on the HDP, killing five people and injuring 522.47 The fact that 
the AKP government proved to be slow in reacting to these events and bringing the perpe-
trators to justice failed to deter further attacks. 48
 A month after the June elections a group of HDP activists was targeted by a suicide 
bombing in the southeastern town of Suruc, where 33 were killed and over 100 were injured. 
This attack marked a return to violence in Turkey’s Kurdish question, as the two sides mutu-
ally ended the ceasefire, in effect since 2013. In this new cycle of violence Turkish security 
forces failed to prevent mob attacks targeting the HDP offices as well as pro-HDP businesses. 
Besides these informal impediments, the HDP was also subject to formal impediments, as 
the security forces detained several party members weeks before the November elections in 
four different cities using the escalating conflict with the PKK as a pretext.49 In October 2015 
HDP activists were once again the target of suicide bombings in a peace rally in Ankara, with 
102 dead and 400 injured.50 As a result of increasing security concerns after attacks in Ankara, 
the HDP leaders decided to call off their rallies before the November elections.51 These for-
mal and informal impediments severely curtailed the human resources and destroyed the 
infrastructure of the HDP.
Uneven playing field
Three major indicators compose an uneven playing field: (1) politicised state institutions; 
(2) uneven access to media; and (3) uneven access to resources. It is possible to observe all 
three indicators in the case of Turkey; these not only skewed the playing field in favour of 
the AKP but also eroded electoral fairness.
Politicised state institutions 
The fusion of the state and the party under the AKP’s dominance has generated deeply polit-
icised state institutions. After his election as the new president, Erdogan refused to abide by 
his constitutionally neutral status and held rallies across the country during the 2015 cam-
paign under the pretext of public openings of construction projects. The Supreme Electoral 
council rejected numerous formal complaints from the opposition parties,52 thereby allow-
ing Erdogan to complement Prime Minister Davutoglu’s campaign schedule.53 Moreover, 
provincial governors (an unelected position in the Turkish context) distributed goods to 
voters on behalf of the AKP government, campaigned for the government informally and 
promoted the ruling party during official functions.54 This support left opposition activists 
with the impression that they were competing not only against the ruling party but also 
against the entire state apparatus. Finally, the AKP took advantage of its penetration of the 
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bureaucracy to access personal information on specific segments of the electorate, such as 
first-time voters and expatriates, and sent them personalised letters before the June and 
November elections,55 in what some claimed as a violation of privacy according to both 
Turkish and European law.56
 Similarly, the AKP government mobilised state employees for its electoral campaign and 
to undermine the opposition’s efforts. The media have documented numerous cases of public 
employees removing campaign posters set up by the opposition parties.57 In many instances 
the police confiscated anti-government propaganda material. Similarly, in May 2015, security 
forces blocked the entry of a cHP election truck into a public square in Erzurum on the pretext 
of ‘damage to a historical place’. Over the following days, despite a favourable ruling from 
the local election board and pleas from the cHP Secretary General, Gursel Tekin, the police 
refused to budge, leaving the party’s campaign workers with no option but to campaign in 
a less crowded area.58 Moreover, local courts in Kirikkale and Duzce, among others, decided 
to remove MHP banners that accused Erdogan of embezzlement before the June elections.59
 consequently, the opposition parties were forced to campaign in their electoral strong-
holds, while municipalities controlled by the AKP were, for the most part, off limits. Some 
AKP mayors pressured local patrons into not renting their salons and stores to other political 
parties for their campaign events. In Rize, for instance, the AKP-run municipality cited a lack 
of legal documents as a pretext to close a wedding salon that had been rented out by the 
MHP as its campaign bureau.60
Uneven media access
In its 13 years in power the AKP spent considerable effort streamlining the mainstream media 
while building a pro-government media bloc, as we discuss in greater detail below. These 
efforts proved particularly successful in creating an uneven political playing field. After the 
2015 elections, for instance, the Organisation for Security and cooperation in Europe (OScE) 
released a report that highlighted the AKP’s uneven access to media via public and private 
outlets. In particular, the state-owned Turkish Radio and Television (TRT) station closely con-
trolled by the ruling party has been a bastion of government propaganda.61 During the June 
2015 campaign TRT allocated 46% of its airtime to the ruling AKP, not counting the airtime 
reserved for President Erdogan, who actively campaigned for the AKP during elections.62 
This trend continued unabated during the campaign for the November 2015 election.63
 Private media outlets with close ties to the AKP, such as NTV and ATV, also undermined 
the opposition’s access to media by allocating one third of their live coverage to the AKP 
leaders. cNN Turk, of the Dogan Medya group, was the only exception, providing greater 
access to the opposition parties, the cHP and the HDP;64 it thus became the target of pro-AKP 
media and AKP supporters, which openly threatened and eventually attacked the group’s 
newspaper, Hurriyet, and its columnist Ahmet Hakan.65
 The picture is no different when it comes to the parties’ ability to finance political ads 
on different broadcasting stations. Needless to say, the ruling party had the lion’s share of 
political ads in the campaign period, followed by the main opposition party, the cHP, with 
a modest 19%. This difference is partly a reflection of divergence in the parties’ resources 
and partly a result of their parties’ politicised access to different stations. For instance, the 
AKP was the only party with access to political ads on ATV, owned by a pro-AKP entrepre-
neur. Likewise, it was the AKP that managed to buy 91% of all the political ads shown on 
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state-run TRT.66 The same TRT refused to air cHP’s campaign ad because it ‘directly targeted 
the ruling party’.67
Uneven access to resources
The AKP government also politicised public resources to skew the playing field against 
the opposition. In the electoral arena this created an enormous advantage for the ruling 
party, which outspent its rivals, leading to unfair competition. The OScE observation reports 
on the 2014 presidential and 2015 general elections document that Erdogan’s campaign 
appearances were often combined with official events to legitimise the use of public funds 
for their financing. On 30 May 2015, for instance, the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality 
organised a public event (to which students and teachers from public schools were invited) 
to commemorate the Ottoman conquest of Istanbul, which turned into an AKP campaign 
rally.68 In their speeches Prime Minister Davutoglu and President Erdogan both attacked the 
opposition. These public events allowed the ruling party to conduct political propaganda 
and gain visibility at taxpayer’s expense. During the 2015 campaign, moreover, Davutoglu 
used state resources to travel across the country to attend rallies in several provinces, while 
the opposition leaders could only afford a limited travel budget from their party funds. 
More importantly, both Erdogan and Davutoglu have access to discretionary funds, which 
are exempt from bureaucratic oversight. Indeed, both Erdogan and Davutoglu overspent 
these funds in the course of campaign periods,69 reflecting a broader trend under the AKP 
rule70, confirming the cHP’s concerns about the use of state funds for campaign finance.71
 The AKP’s access to public resources and authority also delivered greater access to private 
resources in the form of donations and campaign contributions. Businessmen with close ties 
to the ruling party contributed to party efforts in a number of ways. For instance, during the 
2014 presidential campaign, Erdogan had a huge and clear advantage in donations over his 
two rivals.72 In some cases businessmen make in-kind donations to local party officials to be 
distributed to voters. For instance, just after the outbreak of the Gezi protests, Zorlu Holding 
reportedly sent 40,000 food packages – worth in total some two million lira – to the AKP’s 
Istanbul branch.73 In others, businessmen seeking public contracts make donations to the 
AKP chapters, employ party members in their companies,74 and mobilise their employees 
to attend AKP rallies.75
 Alternatively, they make sizable donations to pro-AKP charities. These charities not only 
transfer resources provided by the business actors to the urban poor within the AKP con-
stituency, but they also circulate funds from businessmen to the party elite. The cases of 
Deniz Feneri and TuRGEV are particularly revealing. Deniz Feneri is a charity based in Turkey 
with branches in Germany. In 2008 the German authorities revealed that Deniz Feneri eV 
collected €41 million for earthquake relief in Indonesia but sent €16 million of this to Turkey 
rather than to the intended recipients. The German courts ruled that Deniz Feneri eV was 
guilty of embezzlement and had close connections with the AKP elite. These charges were 
dismissed in Turkey because of insufficient evidence and statutory limitation soon after the 
prosecutors in the case were replaced by the Supreme council of Judges and Prosecutors.76
 TuRGEV, on the other hand, is a foundation established by Erdogan and his family mem-
bers. The recordings leaked in 2013 as part of the graft probe revealed the links between 
pro-AKP businessmen and TuRGEV.77 Not surprisingly, most of those Turkish businessmen 
were predominantly recipients of government contracts.78 The Speaker of the government, 
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Bulent Arinc, in response to a cHP MP’s inquiry about the foundation, confirmed in 2014 
that TuRGEV had collected millions of dollars in donations.79
 Last but not least, new networks have emerged in civil society to provide political sup-
port for the AKP. The Sivil Dayanisma Platformu (civil Solidarity Platform) is established as a 
network of civil society organisations with close ties to the ruling party. The SDP lobbied in 
favour of Erdogan soon after the eruption of the corruption scandal in December 2013. As 
part of this effort, the platform placed ads supporting Erdogan in 4000 different locations in 
Istanbul just before the local elections in March 2014. The chairman of the platform stated 
that the costs were covered by those businessmen who routinely support the pro-AKP foun-
dations and associations.80
Violation of civil liberties
Violation of civil liberties has taken a systematic form under the AKP government, which has 
not only created an uneven playing field but has also securitised dissent. More specifically 
frequent harassment of independent media, restrictions on freedom of political association 
and speech, and suppression of opposition figures or other government critics have become 
ordinary features of politics in Turkey.
Media
The AKP’s pressure on media has constituted a major pillar of its rule since 2002. Besides cre-
ating an AKP-friendly media, the government has also disciplined the mainstream media via 
intimidation, mass firings and imprisonment of journalists, and buying off media moguls.81 
In other words, using its access to state resources, the party has rewarded its supporters 
and punished or isolated its enemies. Thanks to the structure of the Turkish media sector, 
which is composed of companies owned by large holdings with interests in other sectors, 
such measures have been largely effective.82
 To redesign the media sector, the AKP put political and financial pressure on the critical 
media outlets.83 Dogan Media, a major media conglomerate in Turkey, has been the focus 
of extensive political pressure, for example. In 2009, after newspapers affiliated with the 
Dogan Media covered the Deniz Feneri case in Germany, the national broadcasting author-
ity (RTuK) ordered the closure of 11 unlicensed Dogan broadcasting stations and the tax 
agency fined the company a total of uS$3 billion for tax evasion, what many referred to as 
a political decision. The European commission’s progress reports in 2009 and 2010 asserted 
that these fines hurt the freedom of the press in Turkey.84 In response to these measures, 
Dogan Media sold Milliyet and Vatan, two widely circulated and well-established newspapers, 
to businessmen with close ties to the AKP government.85 The pressure on Dogan Media has 
not receded, however, and the company remained an important political target for the AKP 
and its supporters, as we have already discussed above.
 A more recent target of the AKP government has been the Gulen movement, which is 
currently subject to criminal investigation and also under pressure over its media operations. 
Media outlets affiliated with Fethullah Gulen were raided by security forces, ending in the 
detention of executives, journalists and media workers.86 More recently the AKP silenced 
Gulen’s broadcasting stations in October 2015, when Turksat, Digiturk and TTNET denied 
access to these networks in their platforms,87 on the orders of Erdogan’s chief aides.88
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 The AKP government has also established a number of informal institutions to discipline 
the mainstream media. One of these institutions involved the appointment of pro-AKP man-
agers and journalists in major TV stations and newspapers. These figures served as the repre-
sentatives of the government in their respective media companies, supervised the internal 
operations of these stations, and altered news content in line with the orders coming from 
the prime minister’s office.89 Through these intermediaries the government managed to 
limit the air time that politicians from the opposition parties get and gain disproportionate 
access to both state and private TV channels.90
 Erdogan also directly and publicly attacked critical journalists, who were subsequently 
fired by their bosses, fearing government reprisal.91 Those journalists who refused to back 
down in the face of intimidation were purged in mass firings. One major wave struck soon 
after the AKP had won its third term in office in June 2011. Another wave struck when the 
Turkish air force bombed and killed 34 unarmed cross-border petty smugglers mistaken for 
Kurdish insurgents in December 2011. A third major wave hit with the Gezi Park protests in 
the summer of 2013, when the mainstream media refrained from reporting on one of the 
most wide-scale protests in Turkish history. One hundred and forty-three journalists were 
either fired or forced to resign in 2013 alone. Mass firings continued to be a critical instrument 
of censorship in 2014, with 339 journalists losing their jobs.92
 In addition to political and financial pressure on the media, the government has applied 
legal pressure to journalists through defamation and criminal lawsuits. Between 2003 and 
2015 ‘63 journalists have been sentenced to a total of 32 years in prison, with collective fines 
of 128,000 uSD’, excluding the fines charged to newspapers and journalists.93 The AKP has 
also taken further steps to securitise journalistic activity. A new anti-terror law in 2006 allowed 
for the imprisonment of journalists for up to three years for the dissemination of statements 
and propaganda by ‘terrorist organisations’. The law first affected pro-Kurdish journalists; 
under the auspices of the anti-terror law prosecutors detained nearly 150 journalists in 2010, 
a total of 33 people were sentenced to more than 365 years in prison and received fines of 
up to $35,000.94 By April 2012 more than 100 journalists had been detained, most of whom 
were tried on alleged violations of the anti-terror law.
 These practices had already established a deep culture of censorship and self-censorship 
by 2010. A survey conducted among high-ranking representatives of mainstream media 
indicates the extent to which journalists, editors and editors-in-chief are subject to pressure 
from the government.95 Ninety-six per cent of the respondents reported that the AKP gov-
ernment was the most important actor in determining the news content, while 91% agreed 
that they did not report important stories because of government pressure. A Freedom 
House special report on press freedom in Turkey released in 2014 confirms these findings of 
pervasive self-censorship through interviews with editors in the mainstream media outlets.96
 In the meantime media blackout has become an instrument frequently used by the 
government to reinforce the already existing trends of censorship. Reporting on a num-
ber of events and developments the AKP deemed controversial became impossible with 
these blackouts. For instance, 4091 investigations have been launched against journal-
ists for breaches of confidentiality of investigations or for attempts to influence a fair trial 
through their reporting on the Ergenekon case.97 Similarly media blackouts were used at 
the discretion of the AKP government to prevent coverage of the Deniz Feneri case,98 the 
uludere bombing (December 2011), the Reyhanli attack (May 2013), the December 2013 
graft probe, the hostage crisis at the Turkish consulate in Mosul (Summer 2014), the recent 
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clashes between Kurdish resistance and ISIS in Kobane (Autumn 2014), bombings at the HDP 
rally in Diyarbakir during the June 2015 election campaign, and suicide bombings in Suruc 
and Ankara in July and October 2015, respectively.99
 Not surprisingly, press freedom in Turkey has quickly deteriorated over the past decade. 
In 2002 Turkey ranked 99 in the press freedom index released by Reporters without Borders, 
but this has declined to 154 in 2014, as Figure 1 indicates.100 confirming this trend, Freedom 
House changed Turkey’s press freedom status to ‘not free’ in 2014.
Freedom of expression
The AKP government’s pressure has also penetrated the lives of ordinary citizens, substan-
tially curtailing their freedom of expression. Restrictions on social media constitute a major 
roll-back of freedom of expression in Turkey. A striking attempt to erode civil liberties came 
when the AKP government, through its regulatory agencies, blocked youTube and Twitter 
following the corruption scandal of December 2013. Both these platforms were banned 
until the March 2014 local elections, depriving citizens of their freedom of expression and 
information during these major crises.
 Moreover, the government’s surveillance has extended beyond social media and cul-
minated in wide-scale censorship over the internet.101 In February 2014 the AKP govern-
ment amended the Internet Law (Law No 5651) to expand the government-controlled 
Telecommunications Authority’s (TIB) jurisdiction over websites and to curtail judicial over-
sight over its decisions.102 A civil initiative that tracks government intervention in the internet 
estimates the number of blocked websites to be above 103,625, half of which were blocked 
in 2015. 103 This initiative also reports that it is the TIB that underwrote 94% of such decisions.
 Defamation lawsuits have complemented the AKP’s attempts to suppress freedom of 
expression. These lawsuits have targeted journalists as well as hundreds of people from all 
walks of life, including artists, actors, sculptors, composers and ordinary citizens, includ-
ing underage students.104 Their statements and social media posts became the target of 
government surveillance. Figure 2 shows the increase in the number of individuals facing 
Figure 1. Press freedom in Turkey. Source: Compiled from reporters without Borders, World Press Freedom 
index, 2002–2015, https://index.rsf.org/#!/.
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defamation lawsuits since 2011. In 2015, of 460 people investigated for insulting Erdogan, 50 
were journalists, while 281 were members of formal opposition. In the 307 lawsuits Erdogan 
has filed since 2011, he received 1,031,243 Turkish lira as indemnity.
 Severe restrictions over freedom of expression are manifest in the European court of 
Human Rights’ decisions on Turkey. Accordingly, the nature of civil liberties violations under 
the AKP government registered by the court has changed over the years. Between 2011 and 
2013 the Turkish state was indicted for frequent violations of the right to a fair trial, property 
rights, and the right to liberty and security (which concerns issues pertaining to arrest and 
detention). In 2014, however, violations of freedom of expression ranked third in the list after 
the right to liberty and security and the right to a fair trial.105
Repression of opposition and freedom of assembly
In its 2014 report Human Rights Watch asserts: ‘In office for twelve years under the leadership 
of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan the AKP has shown increasing intolerance of political opposition, 
public protest, and critical media’.106 The police have used extensive and disproportionate 
force against the people in anti-government demonstrations and public protests organ-
ised by students, unions, professional associations and environmentalists.107 Police brutality 
reached a new peak during the Gezi protests in 2013, when riot police punished protesters 
with extensive and unlawful use of teargas as a lethal weapon. In the nation-wide protests 
five protesters were killed and more than 9000 were injured, some with severe injuries in their 
eyes or heads. Following the Gezi protests, the ruling party sustained its intolerance of dissent 
and brutally suppressed peaceful activists demonstrating after a mining accident in 2014, 
the May Day celebrations in Taksim square in 2014 and 2015, the Gezi anniversaries, the LGBT 
pride parade in 2015 and, most recently, after suicide bombings in Ankara in October 2015.
 In this spirit activists and students who participated in anti-government protests were 
detained for several months for alleged violations of the anti-terror law. This systematic 
harassment took a new turn after the Gezi protests. Since then 5500 protesters have faced 
charges of terrorism, participating in unauthorised demonstrations, resisting the police, 
Figure 2.  Number of individuals facing defamation lawsuits filed by erdogan. Source: original data 
compiled by the authors from media reports on defamation lawsuits filed by erdogan between January 
2011 and october 2015.
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and damaging public property.108 The government also targeted organised civil society to 
silence the power of critical voices. Among those who were brought before the courts after 
the Gezi protests were also representatives of professional associations, most notably the 
Medical Association, Engineers’ Association and Architects’ Association. Representatives of 
Taksim Solidarity, composed of dozens of civil society organisations with the aim of pre-
serving Gezi Park, were detained and accused in court of ‘founding a criminal organisation’ 
with the intention of inciting violence.109 The government also launched investigations into 
football fan groups and their role in the protests. Thirty-five members of a football fan group 
in Turkey, cArsi, were tried for attempting a coup d’etat facing life sentences, yet recently 
have been acquitted.110
 In addition to directly punishing dissent, the AKP government also looked into the 
finances of independent voices in society. Along these lines in late 2013 the party passed 
a bill stripping the union of chambers of Turkish Architects and Engineers of its financial 
resources and removing it from all city-planning decisions.111 Similarly the government also 
targeted businessmen who criticised the party’s handling of the protests and allegedly pro-
vided logistical and financial support to the protesters. For instance, companies affiliated 
with Koc Holding and Boydak Holding faced extraordinary tax inspections immediately 
after the Gezi protests.112
 Moreover, the government securitised dissent through public-policy instruments. The 
most significant of these steps is the National Security council document adopted in April 
2015. Now controlled by the AKP government, the MGK specified internal opposition activ-
ities as the most important threat to security in Turkey and adopted an action plan to deal 
with civil disobedience, social media activism encouraging dissent, and all ‘acts undermining 
the nation’s will’.113 To complement this MGK document with further legal measures, the 
AKP-controlled parliament passed ‘the Internal Security Package’ in March 2015 to expand 
the authority of the riot police during protests, including the right to open lethal fire at 
protesters, extend legal detention periods and limit the scope of court approval for police 
searches, detainments and wiretapping.114
 Finally, to ensure their complicity in these successive waves of violence, the government 
took steps to protect police forces from judicial scrutiny, thereby deepening the culture 
of impunity in Turkey.115 The AKP government proved to be extremely reluctant to launch 
investigations into disproportionate police violence employed against the protesters dur-
ing and after the Gezi protests. While the judicial system was slow to hold those who were 
responsible accountable, Erdogan supported police brutality with public statements praising 
the police’s way of handling the protests. The AKP’s violations of civil liberties are reflected 
in Freedom House’s civil liberties scores for Turkey, as shown in Figure 3.
Conclusion: Quo Vadis Turkey?
Thanks to the presence of electoral competition, cA regimes are inherently unstable and 
can witness electoral upsets.116 unless the incumbent reverts to highly repressive measures 
to drive the opposition underground, opposition forces can mobilise public opinion to chal-
lenge the government electorally. Indeed, the AKP’s failure to secure a parliamentary major-
ity in the June 2015 elections,117 despite its considerable resource advantages and media 
support, fits this pattern. In line with our classification of the Turkish case as competitive 
authoritarian, the ruling party did not engage in massive vote rigging or disenfranchisement 
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and instead exploited the uneven playing field to keep intact its cross-class coalition – a 
strategy that was sufficient for a parliamentary plurality yet insufficient for a majority when 
the HDP crossed the 10% electoral threshold.
 Because of their political hegemony, however, the incumbents in cA regimes may retain 
their control over the state apparatus even after an electoral defeat. This was epitomised in 
the Turkish context by Erdogan, who, in contravention of the constitution that mandates a 
non-partisan president,118 has sought to shape the political arena after the June election. 
The party also continued to exercise power thanks to deep divisions within the opposition. 
After the June 2015 election the MHP leader Devlet Bahceli’s statement that his party would 
not support nor participate in a coalition government endorsed by the HDP eliminated the 
only coalition option that could have pushed the AKP out of power. This set the stage for 
Erdogan to reportedly block the AKP and cHP from reaching a compromise that would have 
paved the way for a grand coalition. After the breakdown of these talks, Erdogan refused to 
give the main opposition leader, Kilicdaroglu,  the mandate to form a new government and 
instead let the constitutionally sanctioned 45-day mark expire to call for a snap election. 
Given his insistence on letting only Davutoglu lead the negotiations, moreover, Erdogan 
kept the AKP in power through an interim government, despite the absence of sufficient 
popular support and political legitimacy. The fact that the bureaucracy remained strongly 
tied to the AKP in this period allowed the party elites to continue governing the country.119
 If the results of the June election reinforced the competitive aspects of the Turkish 
regime, the AKP campaign for the November election emphasised its authoritarian elements. 
International observers of the election are at a consensus that the campaign period was sur-
rounded by ‘a climate of violence and fear’,120 as gross violations of civil liberties and attacks on 
press freedom hindered the ability of the opposition to compete against the ruling party.121 
More than any other election in the post-1980 period, the November campaign was marred 
by violence,122 polarisation123 and inter-ethnic conflict,124 as already discussed. Police raids 
against opposition parties, media organizations125, and polling agencies that showed the AKP’s 
vote in decline since the June election,126 characterised the period between two elections.
 Against the background of ethnic violence, economic uncertainty and political polarisa-
tion, the AKP promoted the propaganda that Erdogan’s Turkey was attacked by a coalition of 
Figure 3. Turkey’s civil liberties scores. Source: Compiled from Freedom house, “Freedom in the World” 
reports: Turkey, 1998–2015, http://www.freedomhouse.org/.
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outside powers and called for national unity under a single-party government. They used the 
pro-government media to threaten voters that the AKP’s defeat in November would either 
result in yet another snap election,127 or lead to higher unemployment rates,128 and a return 
to authoritarian practices reminiscent of the 1990s in the Kurdish populated provinces.129
 In what came as a surprise to most analysts and pollsters alike, the ruling AKP registered 
a major victory in the November election, increasing its vote share from 41% 49% and gain-
ing nearly five million extra votes in just five months. Moreover, its vote share increased in 
every province, a clear sign of the party’s continued ability to draw votes from a plethora of 
constituencies, including both conservative Turkish and Kurdish voters. After a brief inter-
ruption following the June election, the results of the November election thus consolidated 
the competitive authoritarian regime in Turkey under the AKP’s dominant-party rule. The fact 
that the AKP managed to hold onto power by stretching its constitutional mandate, despite 
losing its parliamentary majority in June, is a key factor in understanding not only the party’s 
electoral success, but also the intricate nature of the party’s authoritarian tendencies. The 
AKP victory can only be seen in the context of rising competitive authoritarianism in Turkey. 
The AKP successfully presented itself as the only viable option in the midst of economic and 
political crises by building on its past record and at the same time skewing the playing field 
against the already weak and divided opposition.
 The future of the political system in Turkey is still uncertain, since the AKP fell short 
of the minimum number of seats required to amend the constitution through a national 
referendum, which would instate a presidential system, thus institutionalising Erdogan’s 
monopoly over power and potentially instigating a drift towards hegemonic authoritari-
anism. For now, as has been evident since June 2015, Turkey is a competitive authoritarian 
regime par excellence. It is not solely the uneven playing field or systematic violations of 
civil liberties but also innate political instability – inherent features of competitive authori-
tarianism – that now characterise the Turkish regime. Whether or not Turkey can take an exit 
from this predicament is as yet unknown. Further research on the economic pillars on which 
this competitive authoritarian regime rests is needed to provide us with plausible answers 
on how the AKP may consolidate its power and whether the opposition can undermine its 
rule in the years to come.
In memory of Tahir Elçi, Kurdish lawyer and human rights activist, who was killed in Diyarbakır 
in December 2015.
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